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Advances in emotion and affective science have yet to translate routinely into psychiatric
research and practice. This is unfortunate since emotion and affect are fundamental
components of many psychiatric conditions. Rectifying this lack of interdisciplinary
integration could thus be a potential avenue for improving psychiatric diagnosis and
treatment. In this contribution, we propose and discuss an ontological framework for
explicitly capturing the complex interrelations between affective entities and psychiatric
disorders, in order to facilitate mapping and integration between affective science and
psychiatric diagnostics. We build on and enhance the categorisation of emotion, affect
and mood within the previously developed Emotion Ontology, and that of psychiatric
disorders in the Mental Disease Ontology. This effort further draws on developments
in formal ontology regarding the distinction between normal and abnormal in order
to formalize the interconnections. This operational semantic framework is relevant for
applications including clarifying psychiatric diagnostic categories, clinical information
systems, and the integration and translation of research results across disciplines.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Emotion, affect, andmood are a central aspect of diagnosis, treatment, and research into psychiatric
disorders. It is the engulfing experience of fear that is central to what we term phobia, persisting
sadness and depleted affect characterize depression, sporadic outbursts of anger are focal to
intermittent explosive disorder, and so on. Yet, research results from affective science have been
slow to translate into psychiatry (1), and studies investigating the relationships between affective
and psychiatric phenomena, e.g., sadness and depression, are significantly outnumbered by studies
dealing with the individual categories in isolation (2).
There are significant theoretical and practical obstacles to conducting research that addresses
questions across two historically separate domains such as affective science and psychiatry (3, 4).
However, there is a growing community-wide recognition that the standard practices of research
in isolated disciplines and diagnostic categories have not led to sufficient progress in relieving the
burden of psychiatric disorder, and thus that a new framework to enable such integration is both
urgent and necessary (5).
Semantic frameworks structure research in a domain by picking out the types of entities that
are believed to be relevant for research and practice, such as types of emotion in affective science
and types of psychiatric disorder in psychiatry. The adoption of a particular semantic framework
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in a given field may have far-reaching consequences, such as for
the allocation of research funding and the determination of legal
and ethical matters in the sociological environment. Historically,
psychiatry has largely been structured according to the diagnostic
kinds formalized in the various editions of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM) and the International Classification
of Disorders (ICD), while more recently the Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC) was introduced (6). RDoC is explicitly multi-
domain and integrative in its design (7, 8), re-organizing
research efforts into upper-level traits (e.g., negative valence)
and cross-cutting constructs, instead of the traditional diagnostic
categories. It was anticipated that re-directing research efforts
into a shared framework of upper-level traits might facilitate
a more efficient integration of knowledge discovery across all
the relevant sciences (6) and better reflect dimensionality in
applicable phenomena (9–11). However, the RDoC proposal has
had a mixed reception in its current form, being criticized for
failing to adequately address the challenges it was designed for,
while moreover introducing other problems, such as a lack of
construct validity and a disconnect from clinical relevance (12–
15).
The need to rethink the semantic framework of psychiatry
in order to enable cross-disciplinary translation and integration
has thus still not been adequately addressed (16, 17). The
community is embarking on an active process of taxonomic
evolution, including the development of a hierarchical taxonomy
of psychopathology as another alternative (18, 19) and data-
sharing initiatives (20). The challenges posed by this situation
are both practical and theoretical: practical, insofar as it requires
ongoing collaborative work to agree on a shared semantic
framework between multiple domains (21), and theoretical,
because there are significant conceptual hurdles involved in
developing a semantic framework with enough substance to
accommodate the complexities of each domain, across not only
psychiatry and neuroscience, but the full range of biological
and human sciences in a comprehensive “multilevel, systemic
approach” (22).
In this paper, we propose that a framework based on
applied ontologies can serve as a practical aid to facilitate
the needed conceptual integration and stabilization of research
constructs in this rapidly evolving focus area. The framework
using applied ontologies offers not a brand-new taxonomy, but
a method to integrate between different, perhaps competing
and contradictory, taxonomies, and to connect the taxonomies
thus integrated to the actual data that arises from research,
in such a fashion that empirical results (arising from research
conducted across different semantic frameworks including the
DSM) can be used to inform the further development of the
taxonomies.
Our approach will be developed in an outline illustrated
by examples taken from affective science and psychiatry. First,
we sketch the methodological framework we propose as a
viable solution to the aforementioned problems. Secondly, we
give an outline of how this methodological framework can
be applied to build semantic bridges between affective science
and the psychiatric domain. We conclude by discussing central
limitations inherent to our methodology.
2. BACKGROUND: APPLIED ONTOLOGY
In recent years, research across scientific domains has been
increasingly characterized by a simultaneous shift toward
unmanageable quantities of data (“big data”) and a raised
awareness of the importance of conceptual integration across
perspectives, theories, and disciplinary boundaries. In this
context, applied ontologies have emerged as a tool to structure
and organize data, and enable conceptual integration (23).
Applied ontologies consist of a set of clearly defined entities
(which may, however, each have multiple labels), structured
hierarchically, and interconnected by defined relations (see
Figure 1).
An example of such an ontology is the Gene Ontology
(GO) (24), which currently (as of May 2018) contains 49,495
entities interconnected by more than 90,000 relations, widely
and successfully applied across many different aspects of research
in the biological sciences [e.g., (25)]. The success of the GO
has spawned similar standardization efforts across and between
a diverse range of other subject areas such as phenotypes,
medical conditions, chemicals, cells, engineering, sociology, etc.,
many of which are accessible as open-source ontologies in the
Open Biological and Biomedical Ontology Foundry (OBO) (26).
These ontologies enable structured and harmonized annotation
of data, mitigating the challenge of ever-expanding research
output through a clever use of digital “data science” technologies
(23), and thereby facilitating both the analysis of raw research
data and the mutual integration of findings across domains and
subject matters (27). An applied ontology is an externalized
(computationally embedded) understanding of the nature of
entities in the world, as viewed through the perspectival lens of
a specific field of research and practice (28). It forms a part of
the research process itself insofar as computational tools (such as
data mining, analysis and aggregation) form a part of the research
process and harness the ontology for their operation. And at
the same time, the ontology forms a part of the community
evolution of understanding about the nature of entities in the
field: ontologies serve as structures which capture the process
and outcome of debates within the field, helping to facilitate the
stabilization and manageability of discourses [see e.g., (29) for
elaboration on the need for construct stabilization in psychiatry].
While applied ontologies generally reflect the subject matter
of a single domain, they have also come to be extended
into concrete bridges between different domains. So there
is, for instance, an ontology representing biological processes
(the aforementioned GO) and another representing chemical
entities [Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, or ChEBI;
(30)]. From here, so-called “bridging statements” in the form
of inter-ontology relationships crossing between two different
domains can be created, for example, by representing the ways
in which different chemicals participate in, and contribute
to biological processes [e.g., (31)]. These bridging statements
capture ontological knowledge, although not about one domain
or another, but rather the ways in which the entities between two
different domains relate to each other. In other words, bridging
statements define lines along which interdisciplinary translation
and integration may proceed.
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FIGURE 1 | An overview of the nature and structure of an applied ontology.
It is precisely such an interdisciplinary effort that we offer
in this paper. We aim to show, in outline, how entities from
an affective science ontology (the Emotion Ontology) can be
connected via bridging statements to entities in an ontology for
psychiatric disorders (the Mental Disease Ontology), in such a
fashion that the bridges enable integration and translation, yet
remain agnostic to the debates and research paradigms within
each of these domains.
Before we can turn to concrete examples of how we propose to
execute this semantic bridging, we need first to briefly introduce
the constellation of ontologies between which we are seeking to
construct these bridges.
2.1. The Mental Functioning Ontology (MF)
Moving beyond traditional disorder categories in psychiatry
necessitates a greater focus on the symptoms and
phenomenology of mental experiences.
The Mental Functioning Ontology (MF, Figure 2) represents
all aspects of “ordinary” mental functioning and phenomenology
that are not explicitly affective or psychiatric in their nature
(32, 33). It includes, for example, entities such as consciousness,
perception, thinking, and believing, and emphasizes the
first-person and experiential perspective of human mental
functioning. It also serves as a mid-level ontology for the whole
of the psychological domain and is thus re-used modularly
within the other ontologies in this suite.
2.2. The Emotion Ontology (EM)
The Emotion Ontology (EM) was developed for the domain
of affective science (34). The entities it categorizes and defines
include emotions, moods, and varying related entities such as
emotional behavior, facial expressions, subjective feelings, etc.,
and the dimensions along which affective experience may be
categorized, such as valence and arousal. The EM was developed
with the view that use of the term “emotion” by itself has
multiple meanings, and the EM therefore offers a way of
exhaustively rendering these potential ambiguities explicit in a
non-ambiguous semantic framework.
The aim of the EM is thus to provide a single ontology,
independent of the plurality of theories that researchers have put
forward about what emotions are [which are, indeed, many: e.g.,
(35)]. In this sense, it aims to serve theories of emotion that
adhere the James-Lange approach of privileging physiological
changes [e.g., (36)] equally as well as, say, appraisal theories
of emotion [e.g., (37)]. In order to achieve this objective, a
multi-entity framework was developed that explicitly includes
different aspects of emotion: the subjective emotional experience,
physiological changes accompanying the emotion, the cognitive
appraisal that is associated with the emotion, the typical
behavioral expression of the emotion including characteristic
emotional facial expressions, and so forth. An example of an
emotion is “fear,” defined in the EM as “an activated, aversive
emotion that motivates attempts to cope with events that provide
threats to the survival or well-being of organisms, characterized
by feelings of threat and impending doom, and by an urge to
get out of the situation” (38). These entities are interrelated and
each is specialized into sub-categories. A schematic illustration of
some of these entities within the ontology structure is shown in
Figure 3 below.
The EM refrains from making claims as to which entities are
necessary for valid annotations, and as such, the EM is designed
to enable the annotation of maximally complex phenomena,
which is partly facilitated by not being committed to any one
specific theory of emotion. For example, it leaves open whether
the feeling of fear necessarily involves the subjective feeling of
fear, and in this way, the EM can accurately annotate situations
where a person was frightened, but only realized at a later time
that she was in fact frightened. Likewise, the EM can also be used
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FIGURE 2 | The mental functioning (MF) ontology: selected entities and relations.
FIGURE 3 | The emotion ontology (EM): selected entities and relations.
to annotate situations where a person is frightened, yet shows no
behavioral expressions.
2.3. The Mental Disease Ontology (MD)
The MD ontology (Figure 4) was developed in order to provide
standardized identifiers for psychiatric disorders across mental
health-related data science, i.e., for informed aggregation of
data annotations across different branches of research, such
as biological, psychological, and psychiatric research (32, 39).
Developed on the premise that ontologies should follow
community-agreed standards for the nature of the entities
delineated in that domain, the MD at present broadly follows
the outline of the DSM and ICD approaches, capturing
different named disorders for different symptom/sign clusters
and organizing them into different groups such as “mood
disorders” and “personality disorders.”
It is widely recognized that the DSM as a classification
framework suffers from several problems, such as a lack
of diagnostic validity, inter-rater reliability, high rates of
comorbidity, difficulty in distinguishing “true” cases from false-
positive and false-negative instances, over and above the lack of
biological markers or specific correlates for specific conditions
[e.g., (40)]. Because of these unique challenges, it is often debated
whether the DSM categories correspond to “real” diseases or
disorders in any meaningful sense, or whether they represent
the right way to think about, and structure the research into
psychiatric conditions (6).
The framework on which MD was developed assumes
that there is some underlying biological correlate for mental
dysfunction, which may be considered a somewhat controversial,
neo-Kraepelinian assumption [e.g., (41)]. However, the
framework does not presuppose the nature of the link from
measurable physical factors to psychiatric experience: the
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FIGURE 4 | The mental disease (MD) ontology: selected entities and relations.
relationship between physical factors and the various psychiatric
conditions is subject to ongoing empirical investigation (42),
as is the contribution of cultural and social factors. Facilitating
integration of the results arising from such research across
different perspectives has the potential to emphasize, rather
than hide, relevant historical and cultural contingencies of
psychopathological experience, while nevertheless furthering
integrative understanding of those aspects of experience that
are rooted in specific biological factors. Our assumption that
mental health stands in a contingent relationship with physical,
measurable factors is equivalent to the observation that we are
not dualists, but does not reduce to the claim that all mental
diseases are brain diseases simpliciter. The MD is not built on
the claim that there is a specific underlying biological cause for
each individual psychiatric disorder type, and that the biological
dysfunction is the reason for the development of the psychiatric
condition over and above psychological or social factors [for a
discussion of this nuance, see (43)]. For most DSM and ICD
categories, distinctive underlying etiological processes in this
strong sense have yet to be discovered. Rather, we acknowledge
the entirety of relevant research, including into the (just as real)
socio-historical and cultural factors (42).
Alternative approaches to the DSM are emerging; not only
the RDoC framework as already mentioned, but also symptom
network (44) and transdiagnostic (45) approaches. The present
paper aims to outline an approach that extends the MD, making
it fit-for-purpose to support these alternative approaches to
thinking about psychiatric disorders andmore recent taxonomies
for psychopathology, such as HiTOP (18, 19), while at the same
time semantically bridging the psychiatric and affective domains.
3. RESULTS: SEMANTIC BRIDGING
In this section, we outline a broad schematic of ontology
entities and candidate relationships for: (a) representing specific
affective-related diagnostic entities, i.e., signs and symptoms, in
their own right, and linking, that is, bridging from those signs
and symptoms to traditional disorder categories; (b) showing
how a multi-ontology framework with bridging relationships can
implement and synthesize the RDoC framework. This schema
will make it possible to build complex symptom networks in a
shared, ontologically consistent way.
3.1. Affective Signs and Symptoms and
DSM Categories
Psychiatric disorders are typically diagnosed based on the
presence or absence of specific signs (i.e., patient behavior)
and symptoms (i.e., subjective patient reported experiences).
For example, in the case of the DSM diagnostic category
Major Depressive Disorder, these include: “suicidal thoughts,”
“anhedonia,” “feelings of worthlessness,” “depressed mood lasting
longer than 2 weeks” and so on. For another example, say,
Antisocial Personality Disorder, the symptoms include “lack of
remorse,” “impulsive behavior,” “deceitfulness,” etc. (Figure 5).
A pair of ontology relationships, has_sign and has_symptom,
are already used in the Disease Ontology (46), to bridge from
disorder to symptom and sign representations.
Thus, we have statements such as:
• “major depressive disorder” has_symptom (“depressed mood
episode” that has_duration min “2 weeks”)
• “major depressive disorder” has_sign “significant weight loss
when not dieting”
• “major depressive disorder” has_symptom “anhedonia”
• “major depressive disorder” has_symptom “suicidal thoughts”
• “major depressive disorder” has_symptom “loss of energy”
• “major depressive disorder” has_symptom “fatigue”
• “antisocial personality disorder” has_symptom “lack of
remorse”
• “antisocial personality disorder” has_symptom “impulsive
behavior”
• “antisocial personality disorder” has_symptom “irritability”
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FIGURE 5 | Bridging from the disease/disorder perspective to the sign/symptom perspective.
• “antisocial personality disorder” has_symptom
“irresponsibility.”
The symptoms (depressed mood, suicidal thoughts, etc.) then
need to be included in an appropriate taxonomic position within
the ontology and given unambiguous definitions in their own
right. These symptoms typically do not form a homogeneous
group of entities of the same intrinsic class (47). Furthermore,
these sorts of entities are not always symptoms of psychiatric
disorders, as they may be symptoms of other disorders, or
mere instances of innocent and mundane aspects of human
mood and affect. For example, “irritability” is a sign/symptom
of Antisocial Personality Disorder, but an instance of irritability
may alternatively be caused by an external event, or a low
blood sugar level. Therefore, we avoid classifying them as
subclasses of a single parent class, for example, under the
class “psychiatric disorder symptom,” but rather we classify
each entity as what they always are – moods, emotional
episodes, behaviors, etc. The statements above thus act as
bridges between the affective sciences and psychiatric science,
through the explicit link between psychiatric signs and symptoms
that are affective in nature, and the related affective entities
themselves. For example, a depressed mood episode will be
classified as an affective episode which has as a necessary
component “the experience of a deep sadness comparable to
grief,” while anhedonia can be defined as an absence or flattening
of affect.
One substantial upside of this approach is that it provides
a computable and formal representation for the signs and
symptoms on their own right, thus supporting annotation of
data independent of the traditional diagnostic categories. Such
desegregation of data clustering will assist transdiagnostic work,
enabling data arising from the isolated investigation of signs
and symptoms to be annotated and aggregated across a shared
framework.
3.2. The RDoC Project and a
Multi-Ontology Framework
The RDoC Matrix consists of domains or constructs which are
intended to be cross-cutting areas of research that have already
been identified (by researchers and practitioners) as relevant
to psychiatric disorders, such as positive and negative valence
systems (i.e., affective phenomena), cognitive systems such as
attention, social systems such as attachment and regulatory
systems such as arousal and circadian rhythms. Each of these
constructs is then laid out across several pre-defined units of
analysis, which are as follows: Genes1, Molecules, Cells, Circuits,
Physiology, Behavior, Self-Report, and Paradigms. Thus, each cell
in the RDoC Matrix corresponds to the combination of a unit of
analysis and a domain or construct.
Most of the RDoC constructs map straightforwardly onto one
of the aspects of “canonical” (i.e., ordinary, non-pathological)
mental functioning in theMF or EMontologies. For instance,MF
has perception, attention, language, memory, etc.; EM has fear,
anxiety, positive and negative valence, and so forth. “Attachment”
is defined in MF beneath “interpersonal process,” alongside
“communication,” as is “arousal.”
On the other hand, the RDoC units of analysis, for the
biological part, map neatly onto the domains of different
ontologies and databases within the OBO Foundry and biological
data annotation efforts more broadly. Thus, we have genes which
are defined by the various model organism gene building efforts2;
molecules e.g., proteins in UniProt annotated with the Protein
Ontology and smaller molecules in ChEBI; cells which may be
1Note that in May 2017, references to specific genes were removed from the RDoC
Matrix following the discrediting of the candidate gene approach in psychiatric
research [e.g., (48)].
2Note that genes are not defined in the Gene Ontology (GO). The GO describes
how and where genes act (their functions and cellular locations), not genes
themselves.
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described in the cell ontology; circuits and physiological units as
defined in various neuroscience resources.
Moving beyond the biological part closer to the psychological
part of the RDoC units, the behavior unit maps to the behavior
branch of the GO and to the NeuroBehavior Ontology (49),
although that ontology focuses mainly on model organisms
(e.g., mice) rather than humans who have much more complex
behavior. Curiously, some behavioral elements are included in
RDoC domains and constructs as well as behavior being listed
as a unit of analysis (i.e., behavior is on both “axes” of the
RDoC matrix). The further units of analysis are self-reports
and paradigms. The self-report unit allows symptoms to be
categorized. Paradigms are the stereotypical methodologies used
in neuroscientific research with human subjects. The Cognitive
Paradigm Ontology (50) includes these sorts of paradigms. Our
point is that each of the cells of the RDoC matrix can also
be viewed as a bridge – an inter-ontology mapping – between
ontologies. Some examples of potential such bridges as drawn
from the research literature are shown in Figure 6.
The objectives of the RDoC include many laudable aims to
synthesize between and enable knowledge to advance and be
translated across the historical boundaries of specific disciplines
and methods of investigation. However, it is precisely because
the aims of the RDoC are ambitiously multi-disciplinary that no
single expert can gather all the relevant information to populate
the entire matrix, nor can the bridges between disciplines
be captured by any one discipline. What makes ontologies
specifically apt to harbor this sort of information is that
they are persistent informational entities (similar to databases),
cumulative in that their annotations grow over time, and can be
contributed to by a full range of community members. As such,
ontologies are inherently multi-disciplinary, aiming to describe
“what there is” without specifically prejudicing a particular
perspective or theory. Their structure is more flexible than a
table or matrix, insofar as they (1) provide defined relationships
between entities, and (2) are formally structured, enabling the
use of logic-based tools to perform automated reasoning (e.g.,
infer connections that are implied, but not explicitly stated).
Similar to the Wikipedia platform for encyclopedic knowledge,
the knowledge embodied in the global semantic knowledge base
of interconnected ontologies can be informally viewed as the
community-wide “hive mind” for scientific entities and their
interrelationships.
4. DISCUSSION: CHALLENGES AND
LIMITATIONS
The approach we are proposing entails creating a dynamic,
structured knowledge base of the entities that are of relevance
across the wide range of topics within the affective and psychiatric
sciences, together with associated empirical findings. Definitional
and essential knowledge about the field is captured within
the (theory-neutral to the largest extent possible) ontological
framework, including bridging relationships, while contingent,
empirical findings are captured as annotations on entities
or relationships between entities. In this fashion, evidence
is accumulated at the level of the entity about which an
investigation is conducted, and can be synthesized as appropriate
to other levels of description, e.g., hierarchically or in support of
specific theories.
One possible objection is that we have given too little
emphasis to the socio-cultural dimension of mental health,
known from epidemiological studies to be of crucial importance
to the development of psychiatric conditions, and moreover
from comparative and historical analyses to be constitutive of
several conditions. We see this issue as orthogonal to, and not
incompatible with, our approach. Empirical results arising from
social and cultural research can be annotated in our framework in
the same fashion, using appropriate classes and relationships, as
biological research results. And diagnostic entities that are socio-
culturally bound can easily be included in applied ontologies
as distinct classes in the framework with their own definitions,
as needed to support the annotation of scientific findings.
Arguably, some diagnostic entities in the DSM are already of
such a type. When enough data has been annotated beneath
a shared framework, applied ontologies will be able to assist
complex statistical analyses including those that aim to elucidate
the mechanisms behind socio-cultural factors in mental health.
However, we admit that an acknowledged limitation of our
method is that it has limited applicability to data that do not tie
in to any empirical research at all.
This approach is of course not a magic bullet that will solve
all the theoretical challenges in the field. Many of the challenges
that surface in clinics and in laboratories today will still remain
even when using the ontological approach. The objective is to
enable synthesis of evidence and aggregation of results toward
theoretical progress in a more flexible and systematic way than
the current methods of labeling and classification allow. In this
section, we discuss some of the challenges which our approach
faces, which to some extent any labeling and classification
approach will face similarly.
4.1. Clinical Relevance: Abnormality and
Thresholds
One of the core points of contention around the definition and
categorisation of psychiatric disorders is the need to delineate
between normality and abnormality, that is, delineating why
exactly the presence of specific signs and symptoms amounts to
a psychiatric diagnosis, i.e., abnormal vs. normal psychological
states. For example, an engulfing feeling of sadness and depletion
of affective response is considered normal if it is observed in a
person who is going through a period of grief, but the same basic
feeling can also be a symptom of psychiatric abnormality inMajor
Depressive Disorder. The original intention of the DSM was
not only to bring about a greater standardization in diagnostic
terminology, but also to reach a likewise greater agreement
among practitioners and researchers in the ways of drawing
thresholds in support of clinical practice (6). However, the task
of drawing a threshold between normality and abnormality in
psychiatry turns out to be more problematic than with typical
somatic conditions [e.g., (54)]. A central reason for this difference
is that many of todays clinical practice with somatic pathology
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FIGURE 6 | Bridging from the sign/symptom perspective to the biological perspective. The Figure illustrates potential “bridging” annotations taken from recent
scientific articles [(51–53)].
is grounded in, and supported by a more complete scientific
framework and understanding of (what we shall call) canonical
biological dispositions and their related processes, compared to
the psychiatric domain.
By the term canonical we refer to those biological dispositions
that have been thoroughly mapped by the relevant sciences,
making it possible to predict specific processes conditioned on
said dispositions. Dispositions are potentialities we have in virtue
of our physical constitution, and these dispositions are realized
in specific processes if certain conditions prevail [e.g., (55)]. For
example, human beings are canonically disposed to develop 32
teeth (8 incisors, 4 canines, 8 premolars, 8 molars, and 4 wisdom
teeth), and we can thereby assert that it is canonical for the
human organism to have 32 teeth. This knowledge is not an
outcome of conceptual analysis, but rather acquired through
empirical research in human biology (anatomical as well as
molecular). One of the central aims in the life sciences is to
discover and map these canonical dispositions and their related
processes.
Obviously, there are many reasons why humans can end up
not realizing their canonical dispositions, for example, not having
32 teeth. But whenever it happens that a canonical disposition
has failed to manifest, we know that there must be an etiological
explanation for the non-canonical finding; an inference we can
draw because we have scientific insight about this aspect of
human nature. It is important to emphasize that this perspective
on canonical vs. non-canonical is distinctly different from well-
known terms in statistics, such as median, mean, mode, range,
outliers, etc. While we often speak about what is statistically
normal and abnormal, this should not be confused with what we
can say is canonical or non-canonical. Indeed, many canonical
states will in fact be statistically abnormal, and many statistically
normal states can be biologically non-canonical. For example,
many people will not have all of their 32 teeth at some point in
their lifespan (for various reasons), making it statistically normal
to have a non-canonical number of teeth. The point here being
that if we did not have the canonical norms available as reference,
we would be inclined to think that having 32 teeth was abnormal,
while, in fact, it is the other way around.
Determination of abnormality in this sense is still a matter
of clinical judgement for psychiatric conditions and usually
necessitates drawing thresholds. In practical terms, the thresholds
we wish to draw in a clinical setting are based on deciding
which phenomena, and to which extent, are clinically relevant.
Although there are several ways to approach this, we draw
on specific resources used within other applied ontology
efforts for the demarcation of these diagnostic thresholds
[e.g., (39, 47, 56)].
Most dispositions are realized on a scale. For example,
sometimes a situation makes us feel a little low, while other
times a similar situations might enormously sadden us. In
addition to this, some dispositions also have a normative frame of
reference, meaning that specific trigger conditions are expected
to realize the disposition in reliable, specific ways. For example,
the disposition to feel nausea is reliably triggered by emetic
substances (e.g., ipecac syrup or spoiled food). Dispositional
normativity, then, refers to the degree of functionality of the
disposition given the trigger conditions, i.e., a failure to vomit
when drinking ipecac syrup would be a dispositional failure,
while immediate nausea followed by purging would be a proper
realization.
The DSM appears to embrace this observation, for example,
with the grief exclusion criteria in Major Depressive Disorder
stating that many of the signs and symptoms associated with
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the disorder could be appropriate or normal reactions to
extraordinary circumstances (e.g., natural disaster, bereavement,
etc.). While we might easily agree that it is normal to feel sad in
light of bereavement, in the context of psychiatric concerns, it is
still a central question to define what degree or level of sadness is
a normal reaction.
Drawing these kind of thresholds is not only a task of
scientifically profiling the relationship between dispositions,
trigger conditions, and realizations, but also of conventionally
establishing what researchers, practitioners, and patients (i.e.,
stakeholders) in a concerted fashion judge to be abnormal.
For example, deciding what exact degree of sadness is normal
vs. abnormal in the aftermath of a bereavement must, to a
considerable degree, involve fiat decisions. Indeed, the diagnostic
ideal that all medical abnormalities will be revealed in abnormal
test scores, and that normal health will result in likewise normal
test scores is an ideal that is seldom met even outside the
psychiatric domain [e.g., (57)]. Consider a relatively simple test
for hyperglycemia, which measures the concentration of glucose
in blood. The diagnostic threshold for fasting glucose levels in
blood is set to 100 mg glucose/dL. But this concentration is
not necessarily a sign of medical abnormality, as non-diabetic
individuals can have these levels. Similarly, diabetic patients may
measure below the threshold.
It follows from this that the very same presentations of signs
and symptoms may be clinically relevant in one patient and not
in another, and that the means and knowledge needed to draw
inferences about the underlying canonical dispositions may be
entirely or partly lacking, partly due to a still limited science of the
enormously complex human organism, and also partly due to our
inability to sufficiently isolate human experiences in laboratory
contexts. While these are, of course, trivial observations, it is our
view that having a framework for data accumulation, annotation,
and synthesis that is able to integrate all the relevant information
and include a detailed description of the wider context in which
the decisions about clinical relevance are taken, will enhance
the research efforts that aim to discover and map canonical
dispositions in the psychiatric domain.
4.2. Partial and Incomplete Knowledge
It is the nature of the complex human dispositions involved
in affect and in psychiatric conditions, that their underlying
biological correlates are similarly complex and distributed across
many different cells and systems. Therefore, many of the bridging
statements that need to be captured in a knowledge framework of
the type we describe are only weakly causal: the effect they have
in isolation from other causal factors is small. For example, many
genes have been implicated in depression, yet none of the relevant
alleles have been found to be individually or in concert able to
cause depression [see e.g., (58)], andmay ormay not be present in
a particular individual with depression, moreover the magnitude
of the influence described may vary from case to case.
In such situations, the imprecise nature of the bridging
relationship causes potential problems for its accurate
representation in an ontological semantic framework, since
the logic on which such a framework is based usually admits only
of binary (true or false) interpretations. Our strategy for such
representation is to harness the disposition model and thereby
represent varieties of “influence” as dispositions that may have an
associated strength and conditions for realization (59). In these
cases we would annotate, say, a particular gene as having the
potential (a disposition) to cause, say, Major Depression, while at
the same time reflect that this particular disposition is not very
strong. Realizations of dispositions are necessarily contingent
on a range of triggering conditions, and the strength of the
disposition is reflected in the relationship between the causal
factor that bears that disposition and the triggering conditions
it requires. Consider as an analogy that both ordinary glass and
reinforced windscreen glass have a disposition to shatter, but
in the windscreen the disposition to shatter is weaker, thus a
stronger force is required to shatter it.
An ontological framework of this kind is able to represent
important distinctions in terms of the character or type of
influence that are represented by a semantic bridge. Indeed, the
influences that might be annotated include not just those that are
causally stimulating, but also those that are inhibitory: an entity
such as a gene might act as a causal trigger of a condition, or its
effect might be to hinder the triggering of a given condition. It
may even be the case that one gene can have a triggering effect on
the development of depressive disorders, while simultaneously
playing an inhibitory role in the development of phobias. Thus,
semantic bridges are associated with a hierarchy of relationship
types to represent these different types of influence.
The strength of causal connections, and their nature, is
only one aspect of the representation of partial and incomplete
knowledge. It is also very important to keep track of the
epistemological status of a given assertion within a knowledge
base, that is, how much evidence we have for that assertion –
and how much we trust evidence of that type. Causal factors
might have been identified based on population-wide studies
or been extrapolated from low-level laboratory experiments in
model organisms. The research methodology gives a frame to the
type of knowledge that may be discovered and the confidence
with which it can be ascribed. Mechanistic details laying out the
steps of influence between the relevant biological entity and the
affective or psychiatric condition being studied may simply not
yet be known.
Semantic bridges, such as the association of a particular gene
with a symptom or disorder category, can thus be associated with
an evidence code (60) and confidence assertion (61), allowing
the resulting knowledge base to be partitioned, if needed,
to distinguish between high-confidence and low-confidence
findings.
4.3. Psychiatric Diseases as Contested
Entities
We have claimed above that ontologies allow representation
of domain entities in a way that can be neutral with regard
to theoretical divisions in a given domain, allowing empirical
research results to be accumulated and subsequently evaluated
and compared in the context of different theoretical frameworks.
Achieving this neutrality, however, is particularly challenging
in cases where the entities themselves are only posited to
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exist within the context of a particular theoretical framework.
Psychiatric diagnostic categories (e.g., of the DSM) are contested
as bona fide entities, and it is also contested whether these entities
correspond to true biological dysfunctions [e.g., (40)].
It is almost universally accepted that psychiatric disorders are
not merely brain diseases. They are trivially brain diseases, in
the sense that the symptoms are almost exclusively dysfunctions
in capacities of the brain, but they are not “simple” or “direct”
brain diseases, in the sense that no obvious unitary malfunction
in brain cells or neurobiology has yet been found to be the
cause in most psychiatric disorders. Rather, it is generally
taken to be the case that differences in underlying biology—
not themselves necessarily pathological—interact in complex
ways with experiences and environment, psychological and social
factors, to give rise to the development of a psychiatric disorder
in a very individual way for each patient. This is known as the
“biopsychosocial” model (62, 63).
The ontological theory of dispositions allows ontologies
to capture the complex reality of the biopsychosocial model
for mental illness, by distinguishing between the complex
dispositions we have based on our physiological makeup and
our past experiences, and the realizations or dysfunctions that
arise in specific experiences depending on our environment and
affordances. To allow the best possible chance of contextualizing
the patients experience and finding the real drivers of illness, the
biopsychosocial model necessitates that complex clinical, social
and psychological histories are taken in order to contextualize
any data that arises when studying patients. Standardized
questionnaires aim to elicit and record some of this sort of
information. Our approach would favor adding each of the
entities that feature in such questionnaires to the ontology in its
own right, appropriately classified, rather than just the summary
outcome, which may be attribution of a diagnosis, corresponding
to a potentially contested entity. This may seem as though it will
lead to a data explosion, but on the other hand if embedded into
the right sort of information system, it will make reporting, as
well as comparison and synthesis between studies using different
questionnaires, easier in the long run.
What our approach suggests is data annotation to exactly the
level that a particular body of research was conducted at, i.e.,
not necessarily whole syndromes or diagnostic categories but
rather the specific symptoms, experiences or behaviors which
were the proxy for the diagnostic category in that particular
research study. This will enable more informed synthesis between
studies, facilitating the harnessing of research results as evidence
toward the eventual theoretical progress within the field. It is in
line with the proposal of the RDoC to focus on cross-cutting
constructs, but allows the domain of discourse to be flexibly
defined by the laboratories and clinics in which the research is
being conducted.
4.4. Clinical Information Systems:
Integration and Translation
Creating formal connections between diagnoses, symptoms, and
other sorts of entities as we have proposed is close in spirit
to the approaches which describe individual symptoms and
seek to infer from data how those symptoms are related in
a network structure (64), and indeed would be compatible
with such approaches, but on the other hand while those
approaches to some extent disconnect the symptoms they
study from traditional diagnoses, our approach would seek
to to maintain all entities and associations as separate data
annotations.
Our approach by its nature represents a large-scale, complex
data annotation and knowledge building effort, far larger than
can be conducted by any one person or group. We are proposing
bridges between multiple ontologies, each of which is owned and
funded through separate pathways. The key to the success of
such an endeavor would be community participation in shared
distributed knowledge building and annotation activities across
multiple different data resources, with the resulting resources
being integrated, synthesized, presented and mirrored widely
and in open access. This raises well-known challenges around
privacy and consent for the use of data with human subjects
(65). Furthermore, there are institutional challenges in creating
the clinical informatics infrastructure capable of supporting
knowledge building and data generation activity with this sort of
scope. Our adoption of open source, open access methodology is
intended to allow for open participation from across disciplines
and locations. We are also able to re-use content from existing
databases where those have been similarly openly developed. Text
mining of electronic health records is one approach that can help
with large-scale automatic data generation [e.g., (66)].
5. CONCLUSIONS
Bluhm (17) argues that because research progresses by defining
constructs “bent toward the laboratory” in different ways for
different fields, each inter-disciplinary integration constrains
the allowed ontology that can faithfully represent both sets of
constructs in the underlying fields. If true, this would lead to an
narrowing of the subject matter that worsens with each additional
field being integrated in an effort such as that we propose. Bluhm
concludes that the development of an integrative ontology would
therefore necessitate that the entities within such an ontology
have limited applicability in the clinic. Thus, she proposes the
development of dual ontologies for different purposes, referring
to the research layer ontology as “explanatory” and the clinical
layer ontology as “predictive.”
It must follow from this approach—having dual ontologies
for these dual purposes within the same domain—that neither
of these ontologies are aspiring to become “realist” in the sense
of capturing the essence of what exists in the reality beyond the
“lenses” afforded by research methods and clinical practice. Yet,
most research scientists and clinicians do tend to believe that the
targets of their work are the real entities in the world, even though
their methods of gaining access to that reality may be constrained
by practicalities.
Delineating all the entities that are the subject of research in a
domain and specifying interrelationships between them, without
specifically privileging one theoretical view as the only truth
(although we do offer definitions for theories and views and their
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corresponding entities, some of which may be contested) offers
a network with semantics associated: ontological relationships
have a rich variety of semantic types. Entities, too, have types
and a rich hierarchy. By remaining agnostic in theoretical divides,
semantic bridges can serve an unlimited number of competing
perspectives on the nature of the entities within each domain
equally well. For example, it can serve to annotate research
investigating Autism Spectrum Disorder as a cognitive disorder,
as well as those theories that hypothesize it to be an affective
disorder.
This form of agnostic annotation is in compliance with the
realist project that the applied ontologies in the OBO Foundry
adheres to Smith and Ceusters (28), aiming to provide an
accurate description of the entities in each of the domains, insofar
as is possible within the limitations of current scientific methods.
Our approach does not offer a new philosophical or metaphysical
contribution. The objective is more pragmatic, and is consistent
with different philosophical positions, as is further described in
Smith and Ceusters (28). What we offer is an approach by which
the practical constraints offered by the methods we have available
can be systematized in a framework that allows for needed
operationalisations to be captured explicitly alongside the subject
matter. When the implicit has been made explicit in this fashion,
different results can be synthesized or disentangled as an explicit
selection depending on the nature of the question that needs
to be answered. It is thus integrative, but not reductive: both
the clinical and the research perspective are given appropriate
treatment.
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